Market Signals Entry #0401 Classified Declassified

Why a costly gesture carries information a cheap one cannot

A claim anyone could make carries no information. A gesture that would hurt to fake carries some, which is why expense so often stands in for proof.

No visual record attached The written record below is complete.
Plate 25 — a ten-year guarantee: a sentence with a price attached.

Intuition test — answer before you read on

Which of these says most about a supplier’s confidence in their own product?

Anyone can say the work is good. Fewer will offer a ten-year guarantee, publish a full price list, or turn down a customer who is a poor fit. The words cost nothing and are worth nothing; the three gestures cost something specific, and only to whoever cannot back them.

What everyone sees

Expense is normally read as waste or as showing off. A long guarantee looks like generosity, a large advertising budget looks like vanity, an elaborate office looks like money badly spent — three assessments that treat the spending as the message rather than as the price of the message.

What is actually happening

Signalling theory states the condition precisely: a signal is credible when it is more costly for a low-quality sender than for a high-quality one. That asymmetry, not the size of the gesture, carries the information. Biologists reached the same result independently for animal displays, where an ornament is honest exactly because a weaker animal cannot afford to grow it.

Why it stays hidden

The mechanism is obscured because the cost is paid where the audience cannot see it. A guarantee is honoured privately, months later, by the small fraction of buyers who claim on it. What the audience sees is only the promise, so the gesture is filed as rhetoric — and the useful question, what would this cost you if you were lying, is almost never asked aloud.

Information travels on cost. A signal that is cheap for a liar tells you nothing at all.

Information travels on cost. A signal that is cheap for a liar tells you nothing at all.

The hidden part — entry #0401

Collect this card

Information travels on cost. A signal that is cheap for a liar tells you nothing at all.

0 / 10,000 collected

Sources & further reading 3
  1. Spence, "Job Market Signaling", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1973
  2. Zahavi, "Mate Selection: A Selection for a Handicap", Journal of Theoretical Biology, 1975
  3. Grafen, "Biological Signals as Handicaps", Journal of Theoretical Biology, 1990

Circulate this file

Annotations are reserved for archive members.

Sign in to annotate