The reason a dress code survives its own obsolescence

A professional firm requires suits and ties. Nobody in the firm believes attire affects the quality of work. The code persists, and the first person to drop it would not be making a fashion choice; they would be making a statement about their willingness to follow the group’s norms.

What everyone sees

Dress codes are dismissed as tradition or inertia: nobody got around to changing the rule. The possibility that the code is actively maintained by a signalling equilibrium — that compliance signals something valuable and defection signals something costly — is less intuitive, because the code is discussed in terms of aesthetics rather than information.

What is actually happening

Akerlof described conformity as a rational response to social norms when deviation carries a penalty. Bernheim modelled conformity as a signalling equilibrium in which agents adhere to a standard to avoid the inference that they are unwilling to comply. The dress code survives not because anyone values it intrinsically but because dropping it unilaterally sends the signal “I am willing to deviate from group norms,” which is read as a signal about broader reliability. Firms tolerate the code because removing it would require coordinated action, and no individual has the incentive to go first.

Why it stays hidden

The equilibrium hides because each individual’s compliance looks like a personal choice (or personal lack of interest in change). Nobody reports wearing a tie to avoid a negative inference; they report wearing it because they always have, or because it is expected. The signalling function operates below the narrative, and the narrative attributes the behaviour to habit rather than to strategy.