The reason a package beats a sequence of single issues
Discussing issues one at a time turns every item into a win or a loss. Bundling them allows trades in which both sides record a gain.
Intuition test — answer before you read on
Why does bundling five issues produce better outcomes than discussing them one at a time?
Two parties negotiate five issues one at a time. Each issue produces a winner and a loser, and by the third issue the losing side has stopped cooperating. The same five issues, presented as a package, produce a deal in which each party gets more of what it values most.
What everyone sees
Sequential discussion looks disciplined and organised: deal with one thing at a time, close it, move on to the next. The assumption is that settling each issue completely before moving to the next is methodical, and that method produces the best possible outcomes for both sides.
What is actually happening
Integrative bargaining, described by Walton and McKersie, requires that issues be bundled so that trades can be made across them. Fisher, Ury and Patton described the same principle as inventing options for mutual gain. Raiffa showed mathematically that single-issue negotiation is distributive — one side’s gain is the other’s loss — while multi-issue negotiation permits trades that expand the total value. A package allows party A to concede on an issue it values less in exchange for a gain on one it values more, which is impossible when issues are settled sequentially and permanently.
Why it stays hidden
The cost of sequential negotiation hides because each settlement feels final and efficient. The parties do not see the trades that became impossible when an issue was closed, because those trades required an issue that is no longer on the table. The sequence also produces a running score — who has won more items — which shifts the dynamic from problem-solving to scorekeeping.
A sequence turns every issue into a contest. A package turns every issue into a currency. The second produces deals the first cannot reach.
A sequence turns every issue into a contest. A package turns every issue into a currency. The second produces deals the first cannot reach.
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A sequence turns every issue into a contest. A package turns every issue into a currency. The second produces deals the first cannot reach.
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Sources & further reading 3
- Walton & McKersie, "A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations", 1965
- Fisher, Ury & Patton, "Getting to Yes", 1981
- Raiffa, "The Art and Science of Negotiation", 1982
Cross-references
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